As I replied to Stephen in the comments to Stephan Kinsella’s Debate with Robert Wenzel on Intellectual Property:
That which exists is rivalrous. That which does not exist is non-rivalrous. So what?
As with seawater, air is also something you can put in a bottle and exclude others from (ask a scuba diver). Just because there’s a lot of it, it doesn’t mean it’s non-scarce (in the economic meaning, if not the layman’s meaning) or non-rivalrous.
The point is not whether the rivalrous nature of things that exist is interesting or useful to observe, but that it doesn’t actually justify or explain anything concerning property.
No other animal has ever been interested in excluding others from things that don’t exist. It takes extreme intelligence and stupidity/superstition to start believing that one can – a peculiarly human talent. It is also rather crazy to develop esoteric terms/jargon to discriminate between things that exist and things that don’t, and to claim, tautologously, that because things that exist don’t have the nature of those that don’t, ipso facto we have property rights.
One could also use other terms such as ‘physically manifest’ or ‘enclosable’ instead of ‘exist’, but the good thing about ‘exist’ is that it helps people recognise the absurdity of claiming property in things that don’t exist. And yes, people then have to be reminded that although we may recognise that things that exist may be in the shape of a triangle, this does not mean that the triangle exists. Moreover, just because we can conceive of abstract objects such as triangles, this also doesn’t mean those abstract objects exist – nor does it mean that the abstract thing we call a concept (of a triangle) exists either, though again, we may recognise this concept in arrangements of ink on paper (the arrangement exists – the concept doesn’t).
So, yes, because human beings (as most animals) have a physical and vital ability to exclude others from things that exist, a power to exclude, they have a have a natural and equal right to do so. ‘Rights’ granted by gods, kings, or states, are obviously not natural. Hence the power to prohibit copies granted by Queen Anne in 1709, was only obtained by annulling the people’s natural liberty and right to make copies, such that this right, by exclusion, could be left in the hands of a few – so called ‘copyright’ holders.
A paper manuscript containing ink arranged into a description of a formula or novel can be kept in a box, and others can be excluded from both the material and the intellectual work therein. Others cannot be excluded from that which does not exist, e.g. the abstract pattern of that work that permeates the abstract plane – which is a rather perverse thought to have in the first place.
In other words, drawing a triangle does not give one any natural power over the abstraction or others’ use of it. Conversely, simply because one has no power over the abstraction or its use doesn’t mean one has no natural power to exclude others from one’s drawing. The drawing of the triangle exists. The geometric concept of a triangle does not.
That which exists may be property, but it isn’t property because it exists, but because we have the natural power and right to exclude others from those alienable objects that exist in our possession.
This is a bit philosophical, but it could be argued that things may exist in realms other than physical. Mathematical truths (such as ideal triangles and concepts) may belong in ‘platonic’ world (also more recently suggested by Roger Penrose). Existence thus meaning that something is objectively “out there” for everyone to find out independently. For example, the same prime numbers can be be found by any man regardless of his predoctrination, even more, the aliens from another galaxy should have found the same prime numbers (as in Contact from Carl Sagan :) ). I think this is as objective as it gets, so one could say that such things in a sense do exist regardless of us drawing them on a piece of paper.
Of course, even if we agree on an existence of such a world, it is fundamentally different from physical and, it seems to me, property rights are completely irrelevant and of no value here.
Comment #000625 at
2013-04-26 07:21
by
Marko
Well, quite. No physically living creature can have physical power, a natural right, in a non-physical plane – or ‘realm’ if you prefer.
However, concerning discussions of property, I think ‘exist’ can be used in its primary physical meaning, as opposed to a metaphorical/mathematical/abstract meaning, e.g. “No solutions for equation X exist”.
One cannot have property in things that don’t exist.
If someone claims that a certain abstraction is often said to ‘exist’, one can exclude that as a figure of speech used by mathematicians.
Comment #000627 at
2013-04-26 07:45
by
Crosbie Fitch
It’s worryingly easy for those who recognise the iniquities of monopolies such as copyright and patent to reject the entire concept of intellectual work at the same time as they reject the monopolies, i.e. they throw the baby out with the bathwater.
As an example of this phenomenon here’s such a complaint from Bill followed by my response:
Bill January 26, 2012 at 11:17 pm
Crosbie Fitch, I disagree that the intellectual work (that is, the pattern of words) is Sheldon’s property. It is his idea, but not his “property.” The concept of “property” is indeed limited to material things that are scarce. You could call his idea “intellectual property,” but it seems to me that that would just be confusing it with actual property. And note that I don’t think this is just a semantic point. Rather, by calling his idea his “property” (intellectual property) you are implying that it has the characteristics of property. Property owners have the right to exclude others from their property. If you call Sheldon’s idea (the pattern of words in the article he writes) his property, then you false imply that you believe that he has the right to prevent others from using their property (their paper and ink or virtual equivalents) to reproduce the pattern of words that was Sheldon’s idea.
Bill, it seems that just as it is difficult for copyright supporters to understand that their monopoly is not a natural right, so it is difficult for those who have deleted the concept of intellectual work from their minds to understand that there can be such a thing as natural intellectual property.
The product we call intellectual work has precisely the same characteristics as material work save that intellectual work is far more easily decomposed into information (more easily reproduced and communicated). If, unlike copyright supporters, you don’t get too upset by the facility we have for copying intellectual work, then I don’t see why you should get at all upset at recognising intellectual work as property.
The thing I have difficulty understanding is why you can’t then resist inferring that I believe people have a right to prevent others producing anything similar to their own productions. Such a right, if it was imbued in us, would require supernatural power.
I have got a poem written on a piece of paper in my pocket and I can naturally, physically exclude you from it. You cannot read it or copy it without my permission. Now where you get mystical on me is to say that this means I believe I have the supernatural power to prevent you composing a poem that is similar to or indistinguishable from the one I have in my pocket. Of course I don’t. I have no natural power to prevent, or right to prohibit you from doing so.
Of course, once I’ve exchanged the property of my poem with you for an agreed payment you can then produce as many copies as you like – I have no natural power to prevent, or right to prohibit you from doing so.
Although authors may be enlightened to recognise the Statute of Anne as an abomination, I think it’s understandable if they sensibly refuse to recognise their writing as solely the material of the ink and paper it’s comprised of.
Just came across this blog + look fwd to following it.
a thought: are you then implying that intellectual property is a secret (like a trade secret perhaps)? && that intellectual property ceases to be such when it is no longer a secret, which as the infamous Jefferson quote points out would seem to go against the very nature of ideas?
++ one thing the internet haz made very clear is this idea of undiscovered public knowledge. I may believe that a particular string of words (or any idea) has never been thought (or will never be thought) before, but it only takes a google search to prove me wrong.
if this is true, then is intellectual property not only a secret, but also a delusion granted by ignorance?
Comment #000559 at
2012-02-12 21:10
by
> a thought: are you then implying that intellectual property
> is a secret (like a trade secret perhaps)?
For an intellectual work to be property it must be fixed in a physical medium (alienable), e.g. written on a piece of paper.
A secret is knowledge that is guarded against disclosure by those (few) who possess it.
An intellectual work can be secret to those who possess it, whether as knowledge within their minds or written on paper in their physical possession.
There is no momentary point at which a secret ceases to be a secret. It is the fuzzy point at which one or more of those in possession no longer guard against disclosure, and may even freely disclose and disseminate the erstwhile secret, such that those in possession can no longer be considered to number in the few.
> && that
> intellectual property ceases to be such when it is no longer
> a secret,
The nature of intellectual property is distinct from the nature of a secret.
Intellectual property shares the characteristics of material property. You can create it (through arranging raw materials), discover it, exchange it, destroy it (rearrange it), and abandon it. It is property because you have the natural power and right to physically exclude others from it. It is not property through notion or privilege, but through natural law.
> which as the infamous Jefferson quote points out
> would seem to go against the very nature of ideas?
There is no conflict between the Jefferson quote and the nature of intellectual property.
> ++ one thing the internet haz made very clear is this idea of
> undiscovered public knowledge. I may believe that a
> particular string of words (or any idea) has never been
> thought (or will never be thought) before, but it only takes
> a google search to prove me wrong.
There is indeed very little that is new under the sun.
> if this is true, then is intellectual property not only a
> secret, but also a delusion granted by ignorance?
It’s up to you whether you want to keep your ideas to yourself, and to any of your confidants and them.
If you realise an idea into physical form then it is your property, and it’s up to you whether you keep it to yourself, exchange it, or destroy it, etc.
Comment #000561 at
2012-02-13 10:18
by
Crosbie Fitch
If the subject under discussion is copyright, it is misleading to
refer to it as “intellectual property” because that lumps it together
with several other unrelated and disparate laws: trademarks, trade
secrets, utility patents, design patents, plant variety monopolies,
database monopolies (nonexistent in the US but existent in Europe),
controlled geographical terms (existing in many countries), publicity
rights (existing in some US states), and more.
These laws have nothing in common at the practical level, so lumping
them together is a mistake. If you want to talk about the ethics of
copyright, please call it “copyright”.
See www.gnu.org/philosop… for more about this
point.
Comment #000607 at
2012-10-09 17:36
by
I never refer to copyright, patent, or trademark as intellectual property. It is misleading if not deceitful to do so.
They have little in common except that they are all privileges – a priori, instruments of injustice. That said, those arguing in their favour often insinuate them as natural rights, e.g. by referring to the fact that an author has a natural right to exclude others from their writings, and the fact that an individual has a natural monopoly over their identity.
There are no ethics to copyright. It is inherently unethical, a privilege borne of crown and corporate interests (the Stationers’ Company being the first publishing corporation).
I’d lump all these monopolistic privileges together as a legislative mistake, corrupt legislation to be abolished as soon as possible.
Comment #000608 at
2012-10-09 19:28
by
Crosbie Fitch
When I say that I find intellectual property perfectly natural, I’m referring to the contention that intellectual work can be recognised as property. I’m not referring to the current regime of repressive IP legislation where unnatural monopolies of copyright and patent have been granted to creators of supposedly original works.
Natural IP is much closer to the sense of property as possession than property as title. So, in my umpteen articles on this blog I’m trying to point out how IP should be recognised as natural and consequently how it should be legislated, i.e. to propose the abolition of the unnatural monopoly, but not the language.
To put Natural IP in context, here it is among four key positions – using the example of a poem:
- IP Nihilism: No-one can own a poem, only the material comprising the copies of it.
- IP Naturalism: Those who have legitimate copies of a poet’s poem own that poem in the copies within their private property (house, car, briefcase).
- IP Monopolism: A poet should also be granted a transferable reproduction monopoly (on the pretext of incentivising publication).
- IP Maximalism: A poet, or his assigns, owns his poem in all representations throughout the universe, forever.
Given people are so used to copyright’s suspension of their liberty, one must emphasise that without such monopoly all those who are privy to IP are naturally at liberty to copy it. In other words, simply because a book of poetry is in your private property, that doesn’t mean your guests aren’t at liberty to make copies of the books you let them have access to. Everyone is at liberty to make copies of works they are privy to – it’s the works they aren’t privy to that they aren’t naturally at liberty to copy.
So, I hope you can see how my position (whilst still against the reproduction monopolies of copyright and patent) remains pro-IP despite being anti-monopoly. And therefore, how it is distinct from IP nihilism. However, the only people who are going to notice any practical difference between IP naturalism and IP nihilism are burglars, those who aid or abet them, their victims, and those handling their stolen IP.
Even so, despite this minor difference, it is quite an important and contentious one – as can be seen from Jesse’s excellent comment on my previous article: IP Nihilism Ad Coelum et Ad Inferos
________________________________
I have to say I agree with most of your views on this subject but I don’t think that “those handling their stolen IP” should be subject to censorship.
I agree that the theft of private information is certainly unacceptable and that it should be punishable but once the information is in the public people who were not involved in that invasion of privacy should not be censored.
For example say that a thief steals a recipe from a company for another company, but also posts said recipe on several websites without divulging its origins. I believe the thief should be punished and the company he stole for should be punished.
But how will you track who may have visited those websites and copied the recipe?
Even if you could, how many people may they have given that recipe to?
Where else might they have distributed the information?
I believe you would need something just as intrusive as copyright to police it if not more so.
And why should they have that information taken from them? they have commited no crime and are not harming anyone else.
I really think that once the information is public it doesn’t matter where it came from, you shouldn’t try to censor it.
that is not to say that i believe that the thief should be allowed to keep the information that he stole or be allowed to distribute it, if you can prevent him or catch him before he does.
But if private information is made public i don’t believe you should try and persue third parties who had nothing to do with the theft of the information.
Comment #000320 at
2009-09-10 11:30
by
Adam
Adam, I don’t think anyone should be ever subject to censorship, i.e. their communications to be intercepted and/or prevented by the state.
However, I do think people who set out to violate another’s privacy by obtaining copies of their work and communicating it without their consent should be subject to prosecution for that violation. That also applies to those who knowingly abet that violation.
People who are unwittingly circulating such stolen IP aren’t doing so knowingly. However, they should at least cease and desist from doing so when it is brought to their attention.
There may well need to be some measure of when such C&D notices are pointless, or no longer in the public interest, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t potentially helpful and valid remedies in the case of IP theft.
Remember that for IP I’m only talking about the communication of identifiable intellectual works, not gossip.
And also remember, I’m only talking about the natural rights of the individual. Corporations have no rights except the benefit of the aggregate right of their human constituents. So, if an employee from one company reveals a recipe they’re privy to to an employee in another company, that violates no-one’s privacy.
Comment #000321 at
2009-09-10 12:02
by
Crosbie Fitch
I think i see where you are going with that, you want to use it as a way to protect the first sale of an intellectual work so that it is still of value to it’s creator. and i think i can agree with that. thanks for taking your time to make this site, i have found it very inspirational.
Adam
Comment #000322 at
2009-09-10 23:15
by
Adam
Adam, I think it simply falls out of Natural IP, that because intellectual work is self-evidently recognisable as able to constitute property it can thus be exchanged.
It is when people who have found the current regime of IP monopoly so abhorrent that they reject IP entirely, that one ends up with the prospect of intellectual workers being unable to exchange their intellectual work.
Let’s restore the public’s liberty by abolishing the monopoly, but let’s not go so far as to liberate the burglar by denying the property.
Comment #000323 at
2009-09-11 07:16
by
Crosbie Fitch
Sorry but i can’t see property as anything but physical, as you yourself have said you have no natural ability to exclude anyone else from “intellectual property” hence how can it be property at all save that you take others natural rights from them to exclude them from making their own copies with their own property.
I am against the theft because i see it as a breach of privacy and that is wrong in my view, something the government should protect against.
I can accept that if someone were to make a copy of your creation by invading your privacy and sell or distribute it before you then they rob you of your chance to profit from your work the first time it is sold and so i can accept something like copyright to protect the creator in that circumstance.
But you will still be taking away my natural right to do what i wish with my property to do it.
Also property is only necessary because physical goods are rivalrous, if i take it you don’t have it. we can’t both have it at the same time.
If they weren’t then what use would there be in the idea of property?
If physical objects became non-rivalrous and everyone had a device that could freely recreate any physical object should someone have a right to deny the ability to create certain things simply because it would benefit them?
Every industry that produced a physical good would want to stop it, they would be rendered unnecessary.
yet look at the good such a device would do, no one need ever go hungry again. medicine could be easily provided to all in need to name a few things.
Idea’s are non-rivalrous there is no need to try and apply the idea of property to idea’s. it is in fact counter productive, you are trying to limit something that is essentially limitless for your own benefit.
If you want to keep something private don’t share it, if someone invades your privacy and takes it anyway punish them fair enough.
Even take the information in all it’s forms from them.
This remedies the breach of your privacy.
But the only justifications i can see for tracking down any uninvolved third party who may have that information and taking it from them are commercial in nature and violate the natural rights of those people.
That copy is theirs, no matter where it may have come from.
you are forcing them to make changes to their property to remove information, in other words you are appropriating their property to give yourself a pseudo property right
As i said i can accept that in order that creators can have the opportunity to profit from their work
but i guess i feel you can’t own idea’s, only your copies of them.
Sorry if i am not very good expressing my thoughs lol.
Adam
Comment #000324 at
2009-09-12 00:43
by
Adam
I would say Adam is agreeing with my view here quite eloquently.
I feel it is important to erase the distinction between data you possess externally, in books, hard drives, DVD’s etc and data which you have learned internally.
You should have the same right to “know” something by archival reference as you have to “know” a thing in your mind. Thus also, you should have the same right to express information you know archivally (share it) as you do to express opinions (speak them.. or perform them, etc).
Once you “know” a thing, or by extension from above have an archived copy of it, it really becomes a part of you.
Thus when Crosbie demands that illicitly appropriated intellectual works should be treated as “property” such that it must somehow be reclaimed, it strikes me as as unnatural as “reclaiming” a loaf of bread from a thief who has already eaten it. Or furthermore, tracking down unsuspecting third parties who have taken a piece and eaten those pieces too.
The thief should be punished. Should be punished with sufficient severity to deter this sort of pattern from ever becoming profitable (upholding the maxim “Crime Doesn’t Pay” ;D) Everyone who collaborated in the theft should be punished as well. Every permutation of how an author could be victimized via privacy violation should be brainstormed to preemptively address this problem.
None of that however requires that Intellectual Work be evaluated as a form of property any more than Service Work is.
Finally of course, I would prefer there not be a precedent of this wording to exist in law if possible, lest future generations begin to abuse this concept of “property” in ways that reinstate public censorship.
Comment #000326 at
2009-09-12 06:22
by
Adam, you don’t have a natural right to something if that involved violating another’s natural right to obtain. If a burglar sells you a stolen iPod, the fact that it is now in your private possession doesn’t mean you have a natural right to either the device or the intellectual works it contains.
Anyway, obviously one cannot undo the communication of knowledge, even if obtained through violation of privacy, however, the further communication of identifiable intellectual works that have been illegitimately obtained can at least be deprecated. That doesn’t mean censorship, but it could mean a cease and desist notice may be warranted against those making them available.
This is the consequence of a natural rights approach to the possession and exchange/communication of intellectual work.
I appreciate there’s a school of thought that holds that intellectual work is fundamentally too slippery to apprehend to be treated as property. That’s what I term IP nihilism. There may well be far more support for that philosophy than IP naturalism. However, at least you now have some contrast with my proposition that intellectual work can be treated as property (without monopoly).
Comment #000327 at
2009-09-12 08:00
by
Crosbie Fitch
True, and i appreciate the work you do here. we definately agree on more than we disagree :).
Adam
Comment #000328 at
2009-09-12 08:31
by
Adam
Great post. I like the breakdown. So today I found out that I am a budding nihilist! (I don’t have a problem with copyright if it is short-term and limited in scope. But as it gets “stronger” I am becoming more radicalized in the other direction.)
Comment #000329 at
2009-09-13 16:58
by
Steve, how could you not have a problem with copyright??
I find a monopoly’s suspension of one’s liberty abhorrent for even a day, let alone a decade.
I find it strange that those who have such a problem with the right against theft have no fundamental problem with the privilege of a monopoly.
I think it must be because people have grown up with copyright and patent. Better the devils you know, etc.
Comment #000330 at
2009-09-13 17:19
by
Crosbie Fitch
The simple answer, compromise. But, as you are also aware, compromise is pointless since those who advocate for a “strong” copyright keep demanding ever greater “protection” and view the public concerns for reasonable use with ever greater contempt.
Also, as you correctly point out – we have grown up with copyright. After all, we can’t question the integrity of our founding fathers. :) :) Why that would be heresy! Consequently, there is an automatic acceptance.
But, since the “strong” copyright crowd increasingly views my rights as being non-existent, my reaction is to move towards the Nihilist position. After all – why should I be constrained by an entity that has no respect for my rights?
Comment #000331 at
2009-09-14 01:40
by
As I replied to Stephen in the comments to Stephan Kinsella’s Debate with Robert Wenzel on Intellectual Property:
That which exists is rivalrous. That which does not exist is non-rivalrous. So what?
As with seawater, air is also something you can put in a bottle and exclude others from (ask a scuba diver). Just because there’s a lot of it, it doesn’t mean it’s non-scarce (in the economic meaning, if not the layman’s meaning) or non-rivalrous.
The point is not whether the rivalrous nature of things that exist is interesting or useful to observe, but that it doesn’t actually justify or explain anything concerning property.
No other animal has ever been interested in excluding others from things that don’t exist. It takes extreme intelligence and stupidity/superstition to start believing that one can – a peculiarly human talent. It is also rather crazy to develop esoteric terms/jargon to discriminate between things that exist and things that don’t, and to claim, tautologously, that because things that exist don’t have the nature of those that don’t, ipso facto we have property rights.
One could also use other terms such as ‘physically manifest’ or ‘enclosable’ instead of ‘exist’, but the good thing about ‘exist’ is that it helps people recognise the absurdity of claiming property in things that don’t exist. And yes, people then have to be reminded that although we may recognise that things that exist may be in the shape of a triangle, this does not mean that the triangle exists. Moreover, just because we can conceive of abstract objects such as triangles, this also doesn’t mean those abstract objects exist – nor does it mean that the abstract thing we call a concept (of a triangle) exists either, though again, we may recognise this concept in arrangements of ink on paper (the arrangement exists – the concept doesn’t).
So, yes, because human beings (as most animals) have a physical and vital ability to exclude others from things that exist, a power to exclude, they have a have a natural and equal right to do so. ‘Rights’ granted by gods, kings, or states, are obviously not natural. Hence the power to prohibit copies granted by Queen Anne in 1709, was only obtained by annulling the people’s natural liberty and right to make copies, such that this right, by exclusion, could be left in the hands of a few – so called ‘copyright’ holders.
A paper manuscript containing ink arranged into a description of a formula or novel can be kept in a box, and others can be excluded from both the material and the intellectual work therein. Others cannot be excluded from that which does not exist, e.g. the abstract pattern of that work that permeates the abstract plane – which is a rather perverse thought to have in the first place.
In other words, drawing a triangle does not give one any natural power over the abstraction or others’ use of it. Conversely, simply because one has no power over the abstraction or its use doesn’t mean one has no natural power to exclude others from one’s drawing. The drawing of the triangle exists. The geometric concept of a triangle does not.
That which exists may be property, but it isn’t property because it exists, but because we have the natural power and right to exclude others from those alienable objects that exist in our possession.